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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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9.July 1974

5-6318.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable Thomas Enders

Assistant Secretary

Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs

Department of State

SUBJECT

The Integrated Emergency Program

- 1. Attached are estimates of how long oil stocks held by the United States, Western Europe, and Japan would last during alternative crises.
- 2. We would be pleased to provide any further analyses you may require.

Attachment:
as stated

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Introduction

In this note we first explain a possible international agreement on oil stocks and demand restraints. We then show how long the agreed stocks would last during alternative oil embargeas.

The Agreement

We assume that the US, Western Europe, and Japan each agree to maintain emergency oil stocks equal to thirty days of normal imports. Moreover, each partner agrees to exercise certain demand restraints during oil embargoes.

In particular, when an embargo causes a loss of less than 7 percent of the partners' total oil consumption, no demand restraints are required by the agreement. When the embargo loss is more than 7 percent but less than 14 percent of total consumption, then each partner reduces its oil demand by 7 percent, and draws from its stocks enough oil to maintain consumption at 93 percent of normal. When the embargo loss exceeds 14 percent of normal consumption, each partner reduces its oil demand by 10 percent and draws enough from stocks to maintain consumption at 90 percent of normal.

Stock Lifetimes Under the Agreement

During 1973, the average total oil consumption by the partners was roughly 38.1 million barrels per day (mb/d). Total average imports were 26.8 mb/d. Given these numbers, the partners would in 1973 have fared differently during alternative embargoes. For example, an embargo might have developed gradually, in the sense that the partners' imports could have been reduced by an extra half percent per day until the import loss reached a maximum of 10 percent.

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During this hypothetical embargo, each partner's stock would have lasted virtually forever. Had the crisis reached a maximum of 30 percent rather than 10 percent of normal imports, then stocks would have lasted for about 230 days!/. Stock lifetimes during other crises appear in Table 1.

Had agreed stocks been 60 rather than 30 days of normal imports, these stocks would have remained longer during each hypothetical crisis (see the second line of Table 1). With 90 rather than 60 days of imports in stock, the partners could have withstood even a 50 percent maximum cut in their total imports for almost a year.

Lifetimes of Stocks Held by ECG Members

The group of partners might consist of all ECG members rather than the US, Western Europe, and Japan. This change in composition would in 1973 have set the group's normal oil consumption at about 34 mb/d, and normal imports at 21 mb/d. But this makes little difference in how long stocks last during crises (compare Tables 1 and 2).

^{1/} A 55 percent cut in OAPEC exports to the partners would have reduced their total imports by roughly 30 percent.

Table 1

Days that Agreed US, Western European and Japanese Oil
Stocks Would Have Lasted During Embargoes in 1973

	•]	Percentage o	of Norma	l Imports	Available	
Stockpiles	90	85	80	75	70	. 50
(days of normal imports)		•				
30	6186	5 619	541	311	230	146
60	12371	l 1213	1060	589	420	230
90	185557	7 1807 .	1579	867	610	313

Days that Agreed ECG Oil Stocks Would Have Lasted During Embargoes in 1973

•	•	-	<u>P</u>	ercenta	ge'of Nor	mal Import	s Availab	le
Stockpiles			90	85	80	75	70	50
(days of imports)	normal		•	•				
. 30	•	. £	orever	889	385	382	261	153
60	•	f	orever	1753	739	733	482	242
90		f	orever	2616	1093	1085	704	332